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Abstract
This paper uses Hungarian data to estimate the structural parameters of a ﬁrm-level investment model with a
rich structure of adjustment costs, and analyzes whether non-convex adjustment costs have any effect on the
aggregate investment dynamics. The main question addressed is whether aggregate proﬁtability shocks (as a
result of monetary policy, for example) lead to different aggregate investment dynamics under non-convex
and convex adjustment costs. The main ﬁnding is that while non-convex adjustment costs make investment
lumpier at the ﬁrm level, they lead to a more ﬂexible adjustment pattern at the aggregate level. This is because
the model is calibrated to have the same proportion of inactive (i.e. non-investing) ﬁrms under convex and
non-convex adjustment costs, but the average size of new investment of active ﬁrms is higher under non-
convex adjustment costs.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E22.
Keywords: Capital Adjustment Costs, Lumpy Investment, Irreversible Investment, Aggregation.
Összefoglalás
A tanulmány magyar adatokon becsli meg egy cégszint˝ u beruházási modell általánosan speciﬁkált beru-
házási költségfüggvényének a paramétereit, és azt vizsgálja, hogy a költségfüggvény nem-konvex tényez˝ oi
befolyásolják-e a makroszint˝ u beruházásokat. A tanulmány arra a kérdésre keres választ, hogy a (például a
monetáris politika hatására bekövetkez˝ o) makroszint˝ u proﬁtabilitási sokkok különböz˝ o makroszint˝ u beru-
házásokhoz vezetnek-e konvex és nem-konvex beruházási költségek esetén. Az eredmények szerint a nem-
konvex költségelemek a cégszint˝ u beruházásokat ragadósabbakká, a makroszint˝ u beruházásokat viszont ru-
galmasabbakká teszik. Ez utóbbinak az az oka, hogy a modellt úgy kalibráljuk az alternatív – konvex és
nem-konvex – költségspeciﬁkációk mellett, hogy az inaktív (nem beruházó) vállalatok részaránya ugyanak-
kora legyen; nem-konvex igazodási költségek esetén azonban az ugyanakkora részarányú beruházó vállalatok
átlagos beruházásmérete nagyobb.
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1 Introduction
In Hungary, corporate investment behavior has been mainly investigated on aggregate data (see for example
Darvas and Simon 2000, and Pula 2003), and only few studies address this question at the ﬁrm level. Among
these few studies, Molnar and Skultety (1999) used the 1996 wave of the investment statistics survey of the
Hungarian Central Statistical Ofﬁce1 to characterize the corporate investment behavior by such factors as
size of investment, number of employees, sales revenues, and to make a correlation analysis of investment
activity with various balance sheet measures. Besides this, Szanyi (1998) uses a PHARE-ACE investment sur-
vey2 to investigate the dynamics of investment activity, and reports the evolution of some simple descriptive
statistics (investment relative to sales revenues and number of employees) between 1992-1995. Finally, Katay
and Wolf (2004) use the Hungarian Tax Authority’s balance sheet data of all double entry book keeping ﬁrms
between 1992-2002, and make a step beyond providing simple descriptive statistics of ﬁrm-level corporate in-
vestment behavior by addressing the question of how the user cost of capital (depending on, among others,
the interest rate) affects investment activity.
This paper is a follow-up of the analysis of Katay and Wolf (2004) in the sense that (1) it investigates the
investment behavior at the ﬁrm level; and (2) uses the same data set. However, there are three aspects in
which the approach is different:
First, as a modeling framework I use the “new investment models”set up by the post-1990 investment liter-
ature, incorporating well-documented stylized facts about ﬁrm-level investment behavior. The two distin-
guishing feature of these models is lumpiness and irreversibility. The empirical studies of Doms and Dunne
(1998)andRameyandShapiro(2001)showedthatﬁrm-levelinvestmentislumpyandirreversible, whichphe-
nomena were then incorporated into theoretical investment models by Abel and Eberly (1994) and Bertola
and Caballero (1994). This paper uses this class of models, with the main focus being on different types
of ﬁrm-level investment costs, including ﬁxed, convex and irreversibility costs that ﬁrms have to pay when
undertaking investment.3
A second difference is that while in Katay and Wolf (2004) the main driving force of investment is the ap-
propriately deﬁned “user cost of capital”, I use a model in which one does not claim to know exactly which
factors affect investment activity and which do not, but there is a “proﬁtability shock”(that incorporates any
inﬂuencing factor) which is the main determinant of investment at the ﬁrm level. As a consequence, much
emphasis is taken on the empirical identiﬁcation of this proﬁtability shock and its distribution.
Finally, I extend the framework to investigate aggregate investment behavior, where aggregate investment
is deﬁned simply as the sum of ﬁrm-level behaviors, by addressing the question of how proﬁtability shocks
(driven by monetary policy, for example) can affect aggregate investment. In doing so, I assume that after
aggregate proﬁtability shocks that hit the ﬁrms, the sum of the ﬁrm-level responses to this aggregate prof-
itability shock will determine the behavior of aggregate investment.
Similarly to previous empirical studies, I ﬁnd that ﬁxed and irreversibility costs of investment are signiﬁcant
at the micro level, which makes investment more lumpy. However, these same non-convex investment costs
make aggregate investment less lumpy and more responsive to shocks. The intuition is that assuming we cal-
ibrate the model to the same inaction rate under convex and non-convex adjustment costs, the same fraction
of active ﬁrms adjusts by larger amounts under non-convex adjustment costs.
1 This survey contains all corporate investment activity that exceeded 10 million HUF-s in 1996 prices.
2 Here data is available about 258 ﬁrms that voluntarily ﬁlled a questionnaire about their investment behavior between 1992-95, so the data set is
admittedly not representative.
3 Stokey (2001) gives a taxonomy of these types of costs, while Bayrakhtar et al (2005) and Cooper and Haltiwanger (2005) empirically estimate the
different cost components.
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INTRODUCTION
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model, and Section 3 discusses estimation strategy.4
Section 4 is about the data and the main variables, while Section 5 presents the ﬁrm-level results. Section 6
contains the aggregate implications, and Section 7 concludes.
4 A more detailed description of these can be found in Reiff (2006).
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2 The odel
Let us consider a general investment model,5 in which ﬁrms maximize the present value of their future
proﬁts, net of future investment costs:























, with At and Kt denoting proﬁtability shock and capital stock




, and β is the ﬁrm’s discount factor. The
capital stock depreciates at rate δ > 0, and the proﬁtability shock is assumed to be a ﬁrst-order autoregressive
process,7 so the transition equations are
Kt+1 = (1−δ)Kt +It, (2)
At+1 = ρAt +￿t+1. (3)
Firms maximize (1) with constraints (2) and (3). Omitting time indices, and denoting next period’s values by






A￿,K￿ = (1−δ)K +I|A
￿￿
, (4)




= CI (I,K). (5)
This is a well-known optimum condition, stating that the (expected) discounted marginal value of capital
(left-hand side) should be equal to the marginal cost of capital (right-hand side).
The timing of the model is the following: at the beginning of the period, ﬁrms have an initial capital stock K,
and then they learn the value of the proﬁtability shock A. This inﬂuences the expected discounted marginal
value of capital (left-hand side of (5)). After this, ﬁrms choose I to make the marginal cost (right-hand side)
equal to the marginal value of capital, taking into account that the choice of I also inﬂuences the marginal
value of capital through K￿), and enter the next period with their new capital stock K￿. In the rest of the
paper I will refer to this sequence of events as the “investment-shock relationship”: in each time period, ﬁrms
respond to proﬁtability shock Awith an optimal investment rate I or I∗(A).
The solution in (5) depends on the exact formulation of the investment cost function. In this paper – follow-




with three types of
cost components.
5 The model described here is similar to the models in Abel and Eberly (1994) and Stokey (2001).




proﬁt function will be deﬁned explicitly later.
7 In model simulations, this will be approximated with a ﬁrst-order Markov-process with the same persistent and volatility.





9VK is the marginal value of capital for the ﬁrm:
∂ V(A￿,K￿)
∂ K , often referred to as Tobin’s marginal q.
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THe Model
THE MODEL








where Γ(I,K) is the cost of investment other than ﬁxed costs. Note that the ﬁxed cost is assumed to be
independent from I, but not from K. It is a common assumption in the literature that the investment cost
function is homogenous of degree 1 in (I,K), and therefore the ﬁxed cost is assumed to be proportional to K.
The second component of the investment cost function is a linear term, which represents the buying (P) and
selling (p) price of capital (P ≥ p ≥ 0). Thus Γ(I,K) can be further divided as
Γ(I,K) =
￿
PI +γ(I,K),I ≥ 0
pI +γ(I,K),I < 0
￿
. (7)
The third component of the investment cost function is γ(I,K), which is the usual convex adjustment cost. I
assume that γ(I,K) is a parabola, with a minimum value of 0, and also a possible kink at I = 0.10 Therefore
the partial derivative of this function with respect to I is non-decreasing, with negative values for I < 0 and
positive values for I > 0, and this derivative is discontinuous at I = 0 if and only if there is a kink in the
γ(I,K) function there.







K. Further, I normalize the model to the buying cost of capital, and assume that P = 1, from which
it follows that for the selling cost of capital 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 must hold. For p = 1 there is no irreversibility, and for
p = 0 investment is completely irreversible.
Finally, following Reiff (2006), I will also distinguish between replacement investment and new investment,
which is a generalization of standard investment models. There are several reasons why replacement invest-
ment is not as costly as new investment: (1) when undertaking replacement investment, ﬁrms often have
their tools and machines checked, certain parts exchanged or upgraded, and this entails contacting well-
known suppliers at much lower costs; (2) learning costs are also likely to be much lower in this case. Though
replacement investment may also entail adjustment costs, it seems to be a reasonable approximation to treat
replacement investment cost-free, as opposed to costly new investment. Speciﬁcally, I assume that invest-
ments up to the size of δK (the depreciated part of capital) have no convex or ﬁxed costs, and ﬁrms have to
pay adjustment costs after that part of investment that exceeds this amount. Of course, when undertaking
replacement investment, ﬁrms still have to pay the unit purchase price of investment goods.

































Each of the different cost components have different effects on the optimal investment behavior of individual
ﬁrms. To see these differences, I solved the model for various simple cases when there is only one type of
investment cost, and compare the resulting policy functions (i.e. optimal investment rates as a function of
proﬁtability shocks) with the frictionless case. (The corresponding ﬁgures are in the Appendix.)
Because of ﬁxed costs, ﬁrms will never make small adjustments whose net gain would not compensate for the
ﬁxed costs. This means that for small shocks ﬁrms remain inactive, but for larger shocks ﬁrms make large
adjustments; so ﬁxed costs lead to inaction and discontinuity of the policy function.
10 Precisely,γ(I,K) is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable except possibly at I = 0, weakly convex, non-decreasing in|I|, withγ(0,K) = 0.
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Irreversibility costs lead to inaction by making negative adjustments more expensive: for small negative
shocks, ﬁrms will still hold on with their initial level of capital, and – in the hope of more favorable fu-
ture shocks – do not take on the irreversibility cost. For larger negative shocks, ﬁrms may end up selling
capital, but as irreversibility costs are proportional to the amount sold, the amount sold increases only grad-
ually with the size of the negative shock. Therefore irreversibility also leads to inaction, but does not lead to
discontinuity in the investment-shock relationship.
Finally, convex costs leave the investment-shock relationship smooth, but make it ﬂatter (i.e. investment
becomes less responsive to shocks) by making capital adjustment more expensive. This is the well-known
partial adjustment mechanism in the presence of convex adjustment costs.
8 MNB WORKING PAPERS • 2010/2
3 Estimation strategy
To estimate the structural cost parameters of the model, I use a modiﬁed version of the indirect inference
method, ﬁrst described by Gourieroux and Monfort (1993). With this approach we ﬁrst select some empir-
ically observable statistics (this can be a regression equation or any other descriptive statistics) that are all
inﬂuenced by the structural parameters of the model, and then the estimated parameters will be obtained by
matching the theoretical counterparts of the selected statistics to the observed ones.
The most important step when using indirect inference is the appropriate choice of the statistics which we
match in the theoretical model and in the data. As discussed in length by Reiff (2006), the following set of
statistics is appropriate to estimate the structural cost parameters of the model:
1. A quadratic reduced-form shock-investment relationship:
￿ iit = φ0 +φ1￿ ait +φ2￿ a2
it +φ3￿ ai,t−1 +µt + uit, (9)
where i denotes investment rate (I/K), a denotes (log) proﬁtability shock, µt is a time-ﬁxed effect and
u is a well-behaving error terms, and the variables with tildes denote deviations from plant-speciﬁc
means. This speciﬁcation is also used by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2005) and Bayrakhtar et al (2005).
The quadratic term (with φ2) is included to capture the non-linearity of the policy function (caused by
discontinuity and inaction, both leading to proportionally higher investment rate for larger shocks),
while the lagged term (with φ3) captures the lumpiness of investment (i.e. investment reacts to shocks
with lags, due to lumpiness).
2. The proportion of inactive (non-investing) ﬁrms in the investment rate distribution (the “inaction
rate”).
3. The skewness of the distribution of ﬁrm-level investment rates.
Therefore, to estimate the parameters of the investment cost function, I ﬁrst calculate the data moments,
denoted by φ0. Note that φ0 is a 5-vector, containing the three reduced form regression coefﬁcients, and also
theinactionrateandskewnessparameter. ThenIsimulatethetheoreticalmodelforarbitrarycostparameters
to obtain the values of the same moments (that is, obtain ￿ φ(F,γ, p)). Finally, I choose the structural cost
parameters (F,γ, p) to minimize the weighted distance between the theoretical and data moments:
￿









where the weighting matrix W −1 is the inverse variance-covariance matrix of the data moments, so any
statistics that is estimated with higher precision (i.e. smaller variance) gets higher weight.
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4 Data and variables
I use the manufacturing sub-sample of the data set of Katay and Wolf (2004), i.e. the corporate tax returns of
double entry book keeping ﬁrms between 1992 and 2002 in Hungary. The reason of restricting the attention
to the manufacturing industry is to eliminate heterogeneities in investment cost. Other than this, the initial
data manipulation is the same, and in most cases I simply adopted the variables constructed there.
The initial data manipulation of Katay and Wolf (2004) consisted of four steps:
1. Observations with missing data in relevant variables (number of employees, capital depreciation) were
deleted.
2. Very small ﬁrms11 were deleted.
3. Data were corrected when considered false.
4. Outliers (with respect to cash-ﬂow, depreciation rate, user cost, investment rate, changes in capital
stock, employment, sales) were also excluded.
As a result of this initial ﬁltering, they decreased the original panel of 1,269,527 year-observations to a panel
of 308,850 year-observations. Since I estimate the cost parameters only on manufacturing ﬁrms, the size of
the sample further reduced to 110,808 year-observations.
As a next step, I also excluded the missing observations and outliers with respect to my key variables: in-
vestment rate, sales revenue, capital stock, proﬁts, so the ﬁnal sample size of my data set is 92,293 year-
observations.12
The key variables in this paper are investment rate, capital and proﬁt. To measure gross investment rate, I
simply adopt the investment rate variable used in Katay and Wolf (2004), who constructed investment rates
from accounting capital data. From the calculated gross investment levels and observed depreciations, Katay
and Wolf (2004) constructed a real capital variable with Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM), which I use to
measure capital stock. Finally, I use operating proﬁt to measure the proﬁt of the ﬁrms.
11 Deﬁnition of very small ﬁrms: if the number of employees is smaller than 2 in any particular year, or if the number of employees is smaller than 5 during
three consecutive years.
12 More precisely, I deleted 18,308 year-observations because of missing investment rate. These were mostly 1992 observations, when initial capital
stock was not available. Then I deleted further 118 year-observations because of non-positive sales revenues, and then I deleted those 35 year-
observations with missing capital stock. Finally, I deleted 54 year-observations with missing proﬁt data, so this is why the initial sample size of 110,808
decreased to 110,808-18,308-118-35-54=92,293 year-observations.
10 MNB WORKING PAPERS • 2010/2MNB woRkiNg papeRs • 2010/2 13
5 Firm-level results
In this section I describe the calculation of data moments. These are the estimated slope parameters of the
reduced form shock-investment relationship (9), the proportion of inactive ﬁrms and the skewness of the
investment rate distribution.
For the reduced-form shock-investment relationship, it is necessary to have a proﬁtability shock and an in-
vestment rate variable. This latter variable will also be used to determine the inaction rate and the investment
rate distribution skewness. In what follows, I ﬁrst describe the identiﬁcation of the proﬁtability shocks, then
discuss the measurement of new investment rates, and ﬁnally present the estimated slope parameters of the
regression (to which matching will be done).
IDENTIFICATION OF PROFITABILITY SHOCKS
I use the method of Cooper and Haltiwanger (2005) to identify the proﬁtability shocks. Assume that ﬁrms






where labor (Lit) is assumed to be adjustable in the short-run and therefore is regarded in the sample with
yearly frequency as being optimized, but capital (Kit) cannot be adjusted in the short run. We assume con-
stant returns to scale for the sake of simplicity, but the same line of argument holds if the capital share αK is
not equal to the inverse labor share 1−αL. Yit is output and Bit is a productivity shock, different from the
proﬁtability shock Ait discussed in (9). I also assume that ﬁrms face a constant elasticity (ξ) demand curve
D(p) = pξ, so the inverse demand curve is p(y) = y1/ξ. Therefore the ﬁrms’ problem is






































































We can rewrite (14) as Π∗
it = AitKθ
it, where Ait is the proﬁtability shock depending on wages, demand
elasticity, labor shares and productivity shocks, and θ =
(1+ξ)(1−αL)
ξ−αL(1+ξ) , a function of the demand elasticity and
labor share.





, which can be calculated from the ﬁrm-level
data set once we have an estimate for θ. The estimation of parameter θ is described later.
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Theproﬁtabilityshockcalculatedthiswaywillbereferredtoastype-1shock. ButasCooperandHaltiwanger
(2005) and Bayrakhtar et al (2005) point out, this measurement contains observed proﬁts, which is measured
with relatively large measurement error. A little algebra shows that there is an alternative way to identify






























Ideally, one need to know the value of the labor share αL for this computation of the proﬁtability shock. But
as I only need the deviation of the (log) proﬁt shocks from their plant-speciﬁc means in reduced regression
















, so when subtracting the






, which can be done once we have an estimate of θ. The proﬁtability shock calculated this way is
referred to as type-2 shock.
Parameter θ is estimated as the “curvature of proﬁt function”from the reduced-form optimal proﬁt equation
Π∗
it = AitKitθ. The estimation itself would be straightforward if all observed proﬁts were strictly positive, as
in that case one could take logs and estimate θ from a linear model. But since there are many observations
with negative proﬁts, I had to use alternative methods:13
1. (Weighted NLLS) I assumed an additive error term and estimated θ with non-linear least squares from
the equation Π∗
it = AiKitθ + ￿it, using ﬁxed effects. To avoid the large impact of big ﬁrms on the
estimated θ, I weighted the observations with the inverse of their size (measured as sales revenue), so
effectively I estimated the equation Π∗
it/Rit = AiKitθ/Rit +￿it/Rit (where Rit is sales revenues).
2. (OLS) I shifted the normalized proﬁt of Π∗
it/Rit by a positive constant C to be able to take the log of

































+￿it with IV, using lagged capital as an instrument.













+￿it by OLS on the same
sub-sample as in case of IV estimation.
Figure1illustratestheestimatedθ-sfordifferentoutlier-thresholds. (Outlier-ﬁlteringwasbasedontheproﬁt-
revenue ration on the left-hand side of the regressions.) It is obvious from the graph that the NLLS-method is
very sensitive to the exact way of outlier exclusion, while the log-model-based estimates do not have similar
sensitivity (despite the estimates being different by deﬁnition because of the different shift parameters C).
It is also apparent that IV-estimates are always higher than OLS-estimates, which indicates that capital is
13 Dropping all observations with negative proﬁts is of course not a solution, as in this case ﬁrms hit by negative proﬁtability shocks would be lost with
higher probability, leading to selection bias.
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endogenous.14 Also, there is a systematic difference between the original and the sample-corrected OLS-
estimates, which is probably because the excluded part of the sample (mainly the 1993-observations that are
used only as instruments for IV-estimation) behaves differently from the remaining part of the sample.
Figure 1
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From now on, I will use the IV-based estimate of parameter θ. It is clear from Figure 1 that the IV-based
estimate is quite robust for different shift parameters C (ﬂuctuating between 0.3372 and 0.3301), so I accepted
the value that is estimated for the largest possible sub-sample (i.e. the one that excludes the lowest number of
outliers): ￿ θ = 0.3372.
It is instructive to compare the estimated curvature of the proﬁt function with other estimates from different
countries. To my knowledge, there are three comparable estimates in the literature. (1) On a balanced panel
of US manufacturing ﬁrms, Cooper and Haltiwanger (2005) estimated θ = 0.50. For an unbalanced panel
of US manufacturing ﬁrms, Reiff (2006) estimated θ = 0.69. For a comparable sub-sample as in Cooper and
Haltiwanger (2005), he estimated θ = 0.46. (3) Bayrakhtar et al (2005) estimated θ = 0.34 for an unbalanced
panel of German manufacturing ﬁrms. Therefore the estimate of θ = 0.3372 presented here is well below
comparableestimatesintheUS,butisinlinewiththeﬁndingsinGermany. Proﬁtsaremuchmoreresponsive
to capital in the US than in Europe.
To further evaluate the reliability of the estimated θ, one can investigate the parameter estimates by indus-
tries; Appendix B contains the details. Results indicate that the estimated parameters are higher (and thus
proﬁts are more sensitive to capital stock) for those industries which we might think to be relatively more
capital intensive a priori, and also that the estimated parameters are relatively stable over time. All of these
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Following Cooper and Haltiwanger (2005), I decomposed the identiﬁed proﬁtability shocks to aggregate and
idiosyncratic shocks. The purpose of this is to ﬁnd a relatively simple way to match as closely as possible
14 The Hausman-test of endogeneity is signiﬁcant at 1% level for all speciﬁcations.
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the rich correlation structure (both across ﬁrms and over time) of the identiﬁed proﬁtability shocks. The









The distribution of the type-2 idiosyncratic proﬁtability shocks is depicted on the ﬁrst panel of Figure 2. The
distribution is symmetric, close to the normal distribution, and has relatively large variance. Table 1 contains
the descriptive statistics of type-2 shocks.15 For comparison purposes, similar statistics for the US (calculated
by (Reiff, 2006)) are also reported. Results show that proﬁtability shocks are somewhat more volatile and
less persistent in Hungary than in the US.16
Figure 2
Distributions of proﬁtability shocks and new investment rates
MEASUREMENT OF NEW INVESTMENT RATES
When specifying the investment cost function, I distinguished replacement investment and new investment.
Replacement investment (up to the depreciated part δK of existing capital stock) is cost-free, the capital
adjustment costs are only applicable for the “new investment”in excess to the replacement investment.
I measured new investment with three alternative ways:
15 Type-1 shocks are much more noisy (a consistent ﬁnding with the results of Cooper and Haltiwanger (2005) and Bayrakhtar et al (2005)), so I do not
report the statistics of these.
16 The time series of the estimated aggregate proﬁtability shocks is also intuitive: there is a big decline in the log aggregate proﬁtability between 1994-96
(from +10.9% to -9.2%), coinciding with the stabilization package of 1995. After 1996, the log aggregate proﬁtability gradually increases to +14.1% in
2002.




Basic statistics of identiﬁed (type-2) proﬁtability shocks in Hungary and US
Hungary US (Reiff 2006)
Aggregate shock standard deviation 0.0993 0.0822
Aggregate shock autocorrelation 0.6932 0.9325
Idiosyncratic shock standard deviation 0.3594 0.2891
Idiosyncratic shock autocorrelation 0.3685 0.6410
1. Method 1. Here I use the average depreciation rate (δ = 7%, calculated for the US) to separate replace-
ment and new investment in the following way:
• If the observed gross investment rate is bigger than δ, then I assume that investment up to a rate
of δ is (free) replacement investment, and the investment in excess to this (i g ross−δ) is the costly
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• If the observed gross investment rate is positive, but smaller than δ, then all the investment
activity is assumed to be replacement investment, and new investment is 0.
• If the observed gross investment rate is negative, then all of this is assumed to be new (dis-) in-
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this case new investment is calculated simply by taking the difference between gross investment and
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case the calculation of the new investment rates is similar to method 1, but instead of delta we use the
observed depreciation/capital ratio as thresholds for replacement and new investment.
The measurement of the new investment rate is of course crucial for the identiﬁcation of investment cost
parameters. Therefore I show the resulting investment rate distributions and basic investment statistics for
all three alternative deﬁnitions. Panels 2-4 of Figure 2 show the resulting new investment rate distributions,
while Table 2 contains the descriptive statistics for the three alternative methods. For comparison purposes,
Table 2 also contains the same moments calculated for the US manufacturing data set from Reiff (2006) – the
moments are surprisingly similar.
It is apparent from Figure 2 and the third column of Table 2 that when calculating the new investment rates
with method 2, there are far too many negative investment rates, indicating that the assumption of each
ﬁrm doing replacement investment in each year is not realistic. However, the investment rate distribution
and the implied data moments are quite similar in methods 1 and 3. Further, the measured Hungarian
investment rates are much more volatile than in the US: the proportion of disinvestments and spikes are
larger in Hungary according to all alternative methods, and the standard deviation of ﬁrm-level investment
rates is also approximately double of what is measured in the US.
ESTIMATION OF THE SHOCK-INVESTMENT RELATIONSHIP
With the proﬁtability shocks and investment rates, now I estimate the reduced-form shock-investment rela-
tionship of equation (9), based on which I to identify the structural cost parameters. The speciﬁcation that
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics of alternative new investment rate distributions
Hungary US (Reiff (2006))
Method 1 Method 2 Method 3
Prop of disinvestments 10.67% 47.15% 10.50% 2.45%
Prop of small investments 39.59% 32.71% 49.64% 42.35%
Prop of spikes (I/K>20%) 35.00% 33.34% 27.72% 19.89%
Mean of new investment 22.30% 9.17% 13.39% 11.84%
St.dev. of new investment 31.28% 31.35% 28.00% 15.10%
Skewness 0.9559 1.1272 1.4984 1.2182
I estimate is a quadratic one between investment and proﬁtability shocks, with lagged shocks also included.
The quadratic term is included to capture non-linearity (because of ﬁxed costs and irreversibility), while the
lagged variable captures lumpiness (also because of either irreversibility or ﬁxed costs).
Table 3
Estimated reduced regression parameters (with standard errors in parenthesis) for alternative methods to measure
new investment
Hungary US (Reiff (2006))
Method 1 Method 2 Method 3
0.1516 0.1660 0.1531 0.1150 ￿ φ1 (0.0098) (0.0105) (0.0095) (0.0085)
0.0375 0.0863 0.0817 0.0822 ￿ φ2 (0.0218) (0.0239) (0.0218) (0.0147)
-0.0349 -0.0355 -0.0332 -0.0251 ￿ φ3 (0.0077) (0.0082) (0.0074) (0.0081)
Number of ﬁrms 12,918 12,984 12,984 1,554
Number of observations17 50,470 51,485 51,485 23,413
Table 3 reports the estimated parameters of this regression for alternative measurements of the new invest-
ment rate. It is apparent from the table that estimated parameters are robust to the way of measurement of
the new investment rate. The only exception is ￿ φ2, which is much lower for method 1 than for alternative
methods.
Table 3 also contains the estimated parameters of the same reduced-form regression for US data, as reported
by Reiff (2006). Hungarian moments have the same sign and similar magnitude as the US moments.
These estimated parameters (together with observed inaction rate and observed investment rate distribution
skewness) will be used to identify the structural cost parameters of the theoretical model via the indirect
inference method.
ESTIMATION OF STRUCTURAL COST PARAMETERS
Structural cost parameters are identiﬁed by matching the parameters of the theoretical shock-investment
relationship, the theoretical inaction rate and the theoretical investment rate distribution skewness to data
17 The number of observations is larger when we measure investment rate with methods 2-3. The reason is that in case of method 1
the number of investment outliers (deﬁned as investment rates above 125%) is much larger.
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moments reported in the previous two subsections. Theoretical parameters are obtained by simulating the
theoretical model for arbitrary cost parameters (F,γ, p). This simulation involves the following steps:
1. Choose arbitrary cost parameters (F,γ, p).
2. Solve for the value and policy function of the theoretical model. For this, I use value function iteration
onﬁnegridswithrespecttothestatevariables(A,K). IncaseofshocksIassumethattheyhavethesame
distribution as observed in data. In particular, I assume AR(1) shocks with the same unconditional
standard deviation and persistence as observed in data (see Table 1). Regarding the other parameters, I
also assume β = 0.95 and δ = 0.07, where the latter is an average depreciation rate reported by Katay
and Wolf (2004).18
3. With the policy function, simulate artiﬁcial data sets of the same size as the original data set. As a
starting point, I simulate proﬁtability shocks, using again the observed distribution of shocks. Then I
use the policy function to simulate the capital paths of the hypothetical ﬁrms in the artiﬁcial data set,
and calculate the corresponding investment rates.
4. Estimate the reduced-form shock-investment relationship in the simulated data set, and also the inac-
tion rate and the investment rate distribution skewness.
5. Do this for several parameter vectors (F,γ, p), and choose the one for which the weighted distance
between simulated and data moments is the smallest.
As it is clear from Table 4, if the cost parameters are F = 0.0001, γ = 0.22 and p = 0.991, the simulated
reduced-regressionparameters, inactionrateandinvestmentratedistributionskewnessarequiteclosetotheir
corresponding values in the data. In fact I found that the distance between theoretical and data moments
(weighted by the inverse of the standard deviation of each estimate) is the smallest for this vector of cost
parameters, which means that this is my estimate for the structural cost parameters.
Table 4
Data and theoretical moments for estimated cost parameters
Data moments Theoretical moments19
Reduced regression φ1 0.1531 0.1207
Reduced regression φ2 0.0817 0.0540
Reduced regression φ3 -0.0332 -0.0669
Non-positive investments 60.15% 60.02%
Skewness 1.4984 1.4872
Table 5 reports the estimated structural cost parameters and their standard errors for various cases. If I
specify the cost function with only convex costs (column 2), the estimated convex cost is relatively high
(￿ γ = 0.761), but the distance of the simulated statistics from their observed counterparts is also quite high
(150.14). Allowing for ﬁxed costs (column 3), this distance decreases substantially to 50.87, which indicates
that the match of the model improved considerably. The estimated convex cost parameter also declines to
￿ γ = 0.479. This is because increasing ﬁxed costs take on the role of convex costs, i.e. we do not need that
much convexity any more if there are also ﬁxed costs. Finally, further generalization of the cost structure by
allowing for irreversibility costs (column 4) leads to further decrease in the distance between theoretical and
data moments (now the decrease is approximately 16%). In this case increasing irreversibility costs are the
ones that partially take on the role of ﬁxed and convex costs, while improving the overall match.
18 In principle, these parameters could also be estimated from data, but this would increase considerably the computation time.
19 For structural cost parameters F = 0.0001,γ = 0.22, p = 0.991.
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Table 5
Estimated structural cost parameters (and standard errors)
Only convex costs Convex + Fixed costs All types of costs
0 1.19E-04 1.00E-04 ￿ F (-) (0.07E-04) (0.18E-04)
0.761 0.479 0.220
￿ γ (0.002) (0.039) (0.033)
1.000 1.000 0.991 ￿ p (-) (-) (0.002)
Distance 150.14 50.87 42.61
The estimated ﬁxed cost parameter, though being signiﬁcant, is numerically small, even if one compares it
to similar estimates of Cooper and Haltiwanger (2005) (F = 0.039) and Bayrakhtar et al. (2005) (F = 0.031).
This estimate means that the ﬁxed cost is 1% of the purchase price of capital when investment rate is one
percent.20
The estimated convex cost parameter is much closer to comparable estimates, with Cooper and Haltiwanger
(2005) reporting an estimate of 0.049, while Bayrakhtar et al. (2005) estimate γ = 0.532.
The estimated irreversibility parameter is signiﬁcantly different from 1, but indicates small degree of irre-
versibility, a similar phenomenon that was also observed by the other two comparable studies (Cooper and
Haltiwanger (2005) estimated 0.975, while the initial version of Bayrakhtar et al (2005) reported p = 0.902).
It is a common ﬁnding that structural irreversibility estimates are much lower than direct irreversibility es-
timates (Ramey and Shapiro (2001) estimated an average discount of 72% on capital sales, while Reiff (2004)
found a discount rate of approximately 50%).
In order to evaluate the relative magnitude of the different adjustment costs, it is useful to calculate the
different types of costs of some speciﬁc investment episodes. For example, if a ﬁrm disinvests by 5%, then it
has to pay a ﬁxed cost of 0.0001, a convex cost of 0.22
2 (−0.05)2 = 0.000275, and also an irreversibility cost of
(1−0.991)0.05 = 0.00045. Sothetotaladjustmentcostis0.000825, or1.65%ofthetotalfrictionlesssalesprice
(which would be 1*0.05=0.05). Of this, 12.1% is ﬁxed cost, 33.3% is convex cost, and 54.6% is irreversibility
cost. So irreversibility in fact is not that small.
On the other hand, if a ﬁrm engages in an average investment project observed from data (when investment
rate is 13.39%), then it has to pay a ﬁxed cost of 0.0001, a convex cost of 0.22
2 0.13392 = 0.001972, so of all
adjustment costs, 95.2% is convex costs and 4.8% is ﬁxed costs. Obviously, convex costs become more and
more important as the absolute size of investment increases.
20 Since the model is normalized to the purchase price of capital, an investment rate of 1% costs 0.01.
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6 Aggregate results
In this section I analyze the aggregate implications of the ﬁrm-level results along two dimensions. The ﬁrst
comparison is based on the differences between ﬁrm-level and aggregate behavior. This approach is similar to
that of Caballero (1992), who focussed on the differences between micro- and macro-level phenomena, and
found that even if there is asymmetric adjustment at the micro-level, if ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks are not perfectly
harmonized, this asymmetry vanishes at the macro-level because of aggregation. The second dimension of the
comparison is based on the differences between the adjustment patterns for different cost structures: when
thereareonlyconvexcosts(sotheadjustmentissmooth), andwhenallkindsofadjustmentcostsareincluded
into the analysis. This way one can judge whether non-convex cost components matter at the aggregate level.
This analysis is similar to Veracierto (2002), who compares the behavior of aggregate variables in two extreme
cases: when there is complete irreversibility, and when there is no irreversibility, and ﬁnds that irreversibility
is unimportant for the aggregate variables. Cooper and Haltiwanger (2005) also ﬁnd that a model with only
convex adjustment costs ﬁts aggregate data reasonably well.
COMPARISON OF FIRM-LEVEL AND AGGREGATE SHOCK-INVESTMENT RELATIONSHIP
To compare ﬁrm-level and aggregate investment dynamics, I estimated the reduced-form regression (9) (￿ iit =
φ0+φ1￿ ait +φ2￿ a2
it +φ3￿ ai,t−1+µt +uit) for both ﬁrm-level and aggregate data, simulated under various cost
structures. For the estimation, I used simulated data (based on the solution of the theoretical model), where
the number of ﬁrms is N = 7,000 and the number of time periods is T = 28.21 The estimated parameters
under the different scenarios are in Table 6.
Table 6
Aggregate and ﬁrm-level reduced regression parameters under different cost structures
Only convex costs Convex + Fixed costs All types of costs
Aggregate results (N=28)
0.0655 0.0877 0.1281 ￿ φ1 (0.0030) (0.0042) (0.0067)
0.5069 0.8029 1.3125 ￿ φ2 (0.3817) (0.5353) (0.8572)
-0.0195 -0.0307 -0.0554 ￿ φ3 (0.0030) (0.0042) (0.0067)
Firm-level results (N=28*7,000)
0.0613 0.0822 0.1207 ￿ φ1 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
0.0224 0.0357 0.0540 ￿ φ2 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0005)
-0.0265 -0.0389 -0.0669 ￿ φ3 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
The results show that the parameters of the linear terms (φ1 and φ3) are similar on the aggregate and the ﬁrm-
level: they increase in absolute terms as we allow non-convex cost components, and they are close to each
other. The major difference arises in case of the non-linear term (φ2): despite being signiﬁcant at the ﬁrm-
level, it becomes insigniﬁcant at the aggregate level, which result is robust across different cost speciﬁcations.
21 These numbers were chosen to match the corresponding numbers reported by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2005).
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COMPARISON OF AGGREGATE EFFECTS UNDER CONVEX AND NON-CONVEX
INVESTMENT COSTS
To analyze the aggregate implications of the non-convex costs of investment, I compare the behavior of
aggregate variables after different types of aggregate shocks. In particular, I will consider the following three
types of aggregate shocks:
1. (Permanent shock) At t = 1, a one standard deviation aggregate shock hits. So the simulated aggregate
shockis0until t = 0, anditis0.1092from t = 1onward. Theidiosyncraticshocksaredrawnrandomly
from the empirically observed distribution.
2. (Transitory shock) At t = 1, a one standard deviation shock hits. So the simulated aggregate shock is
0 until t = 0 and after t = 1, but it is 0.1092 at t = 1. Idiosyncratic shocks are again drawn from the
empirically observed distribution.
3. (Credible permanent shock) Similarly to the ﬁrst experiment, a one standard deviation aggregate shock
hits at t = 1. The only difference is that in this case ﬁrms know that the shock will remain at this level
forever (in the ﬁrst experiment they expected it to return to 0).
In all of the three experiments, I will compare the aggregate investment path under three different cost
structures, which correspond to the three cases estimated in Tables 5-6: the ﬁrst is when there are only
convex adjustment costs (labeled as “convex”), the second is when there are convex and ﬁxed costs (labeled as
“convex + ﬁxed”), and the third is when there are convex, ﬁxed and irreversibility costs (labeled as “all”).
TheﬁrstrowofFigure3illustratestheeffectofthepermanent proﬁtabilityshockontheaggregateinvestment
rates.22 The ﬁrst thing to observe is that a permanent proﬁtability shock of 10.92% immediately increases
the aggregate gross investment rate by only 1.3-2.1%, a relatively moderate rate, and it has a cumulative effect
of 4-5% during the next 5-6 years. The reason of this moderate effect is that ﬁrms anticipate the aggregate
proﬁtability shock to go back to its initial level of 0.
It is also interesting to observe that in the presence of non-convex (ﬁxed and irreversibility) costs, the aggre-
gate response is higher. This is because if we have only convex costs, the estimated convex cost parameter
is necessarily higher, which “punishes”relatively large investment episodes. Alternatively, when all types of
costs are present, convex costs are relatively low and non-convex costs are relatively high, so large investment
episodes are relatively cheap. So it is intuitive that in case of both convex and non-convex costs (case “All 3
types”in Figure 3), the immediate response to the positive proﬁtability shock is larger and quicker (i.e. the
impulse response function becomes zero relatively earlier).
Not surprisingly, similar phenomenon can be observed in the aggregate new investment rate after a perma-
nent proﬁtability shock (second panel in row 1 in Figure 3). So there is an obvious difference between the
ﬁrm-level and aggregate effects of non-convex adjustment costs: while ﬁxed and irreversibility costs make
investment lumpy at the ﬁrm level, aggregate investment is more ﬂexible if we also have ﬁxed and irreversibility
cost components.
The second row of Figure 3 depicts the effect of the one-standard-deviation transitory proﬁtability shock to
the aggregate gross and new investment rates. For the gross investment rates, the same story emerges as in
case of permanent shocks: as convex costs punish large investments relatively more, the aggregate response
is larger for relatively smaller convex cost components (i.e. if we allow for all 3 types of cost components).
As for new investment rates, the steady-state new investment rate is again the largest when convex costs are
relatively low, and one can also observe the largest response in this case.
The third experiment with a credible permanent proﬁtability shock is illustrated in the third row of Figure 3.
When the positive permanent proﬁtability shock is foreseen, it enters into ﬁrms’ expectations, so its effect is
22 For the gross investment rates, ﬁgures depict deviation from the steady-state gross investment rate (δ).
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much bigger. In the ﬁrst experiment we observed that if the permanent shock was a surprise shock in each
period, then the immediate effect of a 1 standard deviation positive permanent shock was 1.3-2.1%, and the
cumulative effect was 4-5% during the consecutive 5-6 years. Now if the permanent proﬁtability shock is
credible and it is a common knowledge that it will stay at this level forever, then its immediate effect is as
high as 7.2-11.5%, while the cumulative effect is 24.1-24.3% during the consecutive 10 years. Not surprisingly
if authorities can make the intended positive proﬁtability shock foreseen and credible, then its effect can be
much bigger.
Also, it is apparent (perhaps even more than before) from the graphs in the third row of Figure 3 that aggre-
gate investment is the most responsive to proﬁtability shocks if we have all types of investment costs, which
is the same result that I reported earlier for the other types of proﬁtability shocks.
To further study the dynamics of investment adjustment under different cost structures, it may be useful to
track the distribution of ﬁrm-level adjustments after a proﬁtability shock. The observed inaction rate can
be particularly interesting after such a hypothetical proﬁtability shock. Figure 4 illustrates the inaction rate
(the proportion of ﬁrms that stay inactive) after a permanent proﬁtability shock. As we saw in the ﬁrst row
of Figure 3, adjustment is quicker if we have all types of adjustment costs, as opposed to only convex costs.
Now Figure 4 is telling us that this quicker adjustment takes place mainly on the intensive margin: higher
aggregate investment rates occur at similar inaction rates, from which we can infer two things. (1) If we
have all types of adjustment costs, adjusting ﬁrms must make relatively larger adjustments than in case of
only convex costs, and (2) ﬁrms that are inactive under only convex costs also tend to remain inactive if we
have all types of adjustment costs. Experimenting with the other two types of aggregate proﬁtability shocks
leads to the same conclusion: adjustment takes place at the similar inaction rates under the different cost
speciﬁcations, so adjustment takes place on the intensive margin also in these cases.
Figure 4
Effect of a permanent proﬁtability shock to the inaction rate
When tracking the inaction rates under different cost structures, one might ask how inaction occurs at all
when there are only convex costs of adjustment. Indeed, standard investment models with convex adjust-
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ment cost suggest that in this case there is no inaction at all. However, if one makes distinction between
replacement investment and new investment, then inaction in new investment can emerge easily, especially
if the convex cost component is high. The reason of this is that convex costs make the shock-investment re-
lationship ﬂat, and therefore for a large interval of shocks the optimal gross investment rate will be between
0 and the depreciation rate, meaning that the new investment rate is zero in these cases. This phenomenon
is also observable on the bottom panel of Figure 5 in the Appendix, where the optimal shock-investment
relationship is depicted for the case of “only convex costs”. With a relatively modest convex cost parameter
(in the ﬁgure γ = 0.2), the inaction rate of new investments is already visible. The case discussed here has a
much higher convex cost parameter: γ = 0.761, therefore the shock-investment relationship is even ﬂatter, so
it is not a surprise that the inaction in new investment rates is as high as 60% in steady state.
All of these experiments suggest that there are important aggregate implications of the non-convex invest-
ment costs. This statement contradicts the main conclusion of Veracierto (2002) and Khan and Thomas
(2003), who found that there is no aggregate implication of investment irreversibility at the plant level.
There are two reasons for this difference. First, general equilibrium effects (through changes in equilib-
rium prices) are not considered here. Second, there is a difference between the magnitudes of identiﬁed
proﬁtability shocks. In this paper, the standard deviations of the aggregate and idiosyncratic proﬁtability
shocks are 0.0993 and 0.3594, respectively, much larger than the standard deviation of the productivity shock
in Veracierto (2002): 0.0063.23 As a consequence of this, the irreversibility constraint is effective for many
observations in the simulations, while it is never binding for Veracierto; as he notes, this is the ultimate rea-
son of the opposite conclusions. Studies with comparable shock standard deviations (Coleman, 1997, Faig,
1997, and Ramey and Shapiro, 1997) ﬁnd important aggregate effects of irreversible investment.
23 There are important differences between the identiﬁcation of these standard deviations. Most importantly, Veracierto (2002) deals with productivity
shocks, and identiﬁes them from observed Solow-residuals. In contrast, our key concept is the proﬁtability shock, which incorporates Veracierto’s
productivity shock, and many other sources of shocks: labor shares, demand elasticities and wages.
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7 Conclusion
This paper estimates the structural parameters of a ﬁrm-level investment model with a rich structure of
adjustment costs, and analyzes whether non-convex adjustment cost components have any effect on the
aggregate investment dynamics.
The most important ﬁrm-level results can be summarized as follows:
• Non-convex adjustment costs of investment are signiﬁcant, because the model with all kinds of adjust-
ment costs leads to a much better ﬁt than that having only convex adjustment cost.
• The estimated adjustment cost parameters are close to estimates prepared with similar methods.
On the aggregate level, the main focus is on the analysis of how aggregate proﬁtability shocks inﬂuence
aggregate investment dynamics. The aggregate results are the following:
• The aggregate investment equation (optimal investment rate as a function of shocks) is highly different
from the ﬁrm-level investment equation (a robust result across adjustment cost speciﬁcations). The
main difference is that the shock-investment relationship is found to be highly non-linear at the ﬁrm-
level, whereas at the aggregate level the non-linear term becomes insigniﬁcant.
• Aggregate permanent proﬁtability shocks, when they are not anticipated to be permanent, have mod-
erate effects on aggregate investment dynamics: an aggregate shock bigger than of 10% induces an
immediate response of 1-2% in aggregate gross investment rate, while the cumulative effect is not more
than 4-5%.
• In contrast, credible permanent aggregate proﬁtability shocks have much bigger effect on aggregate
investment rates: a credible aggregate shock of 10.92% triggers a 7.2%-11.5% immediate increase in
aggregate gross investment rate, while the cumulative effect is 24.1-24.3% over the next 10 years.
• Aggregate investment responses are larger if there are non-convexities in the investment costs, and
smaller when the investment cost function is convex. This is interesting because non-convexities in the
adjustment cost function make investment more lumpy at the ﬁrm-level, but make it more ﬂexible at
the aggregate level.
• If among the investment costs there are also non-convex costs, the apparently bigger adjustment takes
place on the intensive margin. This is because a more ﬂexible aggregate effect occurs at a similar
inaction rate.
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Appendix
OPTIMAL INVESTMENT UNDER DIFFERENT SIMPLE COST STRUCTURES
Figure 5 depicts the optimal investment (as a function of proﬁtability shock) in four simple cases. The top
panel compares the policy functions under non-convex adjustment costs and in the frictionless case, while
the bottom panel does the same for convex adjustment costs.
1. Frictionless case. (F = 0,γ = 0, p = 1) Investment is non-zero whenever the shock is non-zero, i.e. we
have instantaneous adjustment. Optimal investment is a convex function of proﬁtability, reﬂecting the
law of diminishing returns for the capital: when a large shock increases the marginal value of capital
(q), we need a proportionally higher increase in the capital stock to restore the optimality condition of
q = 1/β. Therefore the estimated shock-investment relationship is also slightly convex: ￿ φ1 = 2.5233,
￿ φ2 = 0.4384, ￿ φ3 = −2.5151. When investment is cost-free, investment rates are relatively high even for
small shocks: a typical proﬁtability shock (of one standard deviation ￿ a = 0.1) triggers an immediate
investment of 25.67% (2.5233*0.1 + 0.4384*0.1*0.1).
2. Irreversible case. (F = 0,γ = 0, p = 0.95) Irreversibility creates an inaction region, but the investment
function remains continuous: small investment episodes are still possible. Because of the inaction
region, the shock-investment relationship becomes more convex, and as it is expensive to sell capital,
we need very large negative shocks (<-30%) to trigger negative investments. The estimated parameters
of the reduced form regression are ￿ φ1 = 0.8520, ￿ φ2 = 0.3928, ￿ φ3 = −0.5564. Convexity is stronger (the
relative size of ￿ φ2/￿ φ1 increased), and the absolute value of the parameters decreased, so the effect of
proﬁtability shocks is much smaller (a 1 standard deviation proﬁtability shock, ￿ a = 0.1 leads to 8.91%
= 0.8520*0.1 + 0.3928*0.1*0.1 investment rate).
3. Fixed cost case. (F = 0.001,γ = 0, p = 1) This is basically the same as in the frictionless case, but ﬁrms
do not undertake small investments, when the net gain is smaller than ﬁxed costs. So ﬁxed costs create
an inaction region, and also lead to discontinuity, as no small investment activity is observed. The esti-
mated parameters of the reduced form regression are: ￿ φ1 = 2.4475, ￿ φ2 = 0.4423, ￿ φ3 = −2.4165, which
is very similar to the frictionless case. This result is intuitive, as the graph of the investment function
has not changed dramatically. A 1 standard deviation proﬁtability shock leads to an investment rate of
24.92% (2.4475*0.1 + 0.4423*0.1*0.1), which is also similar to the frictionless case.
4. Convex case. (F = 0,γ = 0.2, p = 1) Investment is instantaneous, i.e. any shock leads to some in-
vestment activity, but as the marginal cost increased, it is of smaller magnitude (the function became
ﬂatter). Estimatedreducedregressionparameters: ￿ φ1 = 0.4657, ￿ φ2 = 0.0672, ￿ φ3 = −0.2557, soa1stan-
dard deviation proﬁtability shock leads to an investment rate of 4.72% (0.4657*0.1 + 0.0672*0.1*0.1),
which is much smaller than in the frictionless case.
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Figure 5
Optimal investment under different simple cost structures
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APPENDIX
SECTORAL ESTIMATION OF PARAMETER θ (THE CURVATURE OF THE PROFIT
FUNCTION)
To further investigate the reliability of the estimated θ parameter, I estimated it separately for the different
manufacturing sub-sectors (this time I only used the IV method on the shifted log-log model). As it is appar-
ent from Figure 6, relatively more capital-intensive sectors (chemical industry, machinery) have somewhat
larger estimates, which means that proﬁt is more responsive to capital in these sectors. Figure 6 also suggests
that outliers do not have large impact on the relative size of estimated industry-speciﬁc θ-s, the same result
that we also found at the aggregate level.
Figure 6
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To investigate the stability of the estimated parameters over time, I divided the data set into two further
sub-samples: one early sub-sample containing observations between 1993-1997, and another sub-sample with
observations between 1998-2002. As it is apparent from Figure 6, the estimates on the whole sample (1993-
2002) are mainly driven by the estimates between 1998-2002, and the estimates based in early period of
1993-97 are relatively different. This is either because relatively noise data in 1993-94 (something that Katay
and Wolf (2004) also suspect), or because ﬁrms behaved somewhat differently during these early years of
transition.
IDENTIFICATION: THE RESPONSIVENESS OF MATCHED MOMENTS TO STRUCTURAL
COST PARAMETERS
In Section 3 I claim that the reduced-regression parameters do not contain sufﬁcient information about F,
the ﬁxed cost of investment. The reason of this is that in the frictionless case, changing F does not lead to
changes in the estimated reduced regression parameters. This is also evident on the top panel of Figure 5 in
Appendix A.
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This is, however, only a “local”ﬁnding for the frictionless case, and it still remains to be seen that something
similar happens for changes in the ﬁxed cost parameter when the other types of costs (convex, irreversibility
costs) are non-zero. To investigate this, let us investigate the following matrix:
B =

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This so-called “binding matrix”shows how sensitive are the matched moments to the estimated structural













∂ F are all close to zero (as in the frictionless case), then the ﬁrst column of the binding
matrix is also close to zero, so the estimated standard error of the ﬁxed cost parameter is very large.
Since it is impossible to prove globally that one particular column of the binding matrix is close to zero, I
numerically investigated this binding matrix for some triplets of the structural cost parameters. For example,











Thismeansthata1%increasein F woulddecreaseφ1 by3.5E−05,amuchsmallereffectthana1%increasein
γ and p would cause (6.9E −04 and 1.67E-04, respectively). The same is true for φ2 and φ3. In other words,
the elements in the ﬁrst column of the binding matrix are not large enough to bring down the estimated
standard error of F so that it becomes signiﬁcant.
In such a case the solution is to include further moments which are more responsive to changes in structural
parameters. In our example these are the inaction rate and the skewness of the investment rate distribution.
Adding these to the set of matched moments, the ﬁrst column of the binding matrix becomes
B =









    

(where the fourth and ﬁfth rows of the binding matrix belong to the inaction rate and the skewness, respec-
tively). It is clear that the main identifying moment of the ﬁxed cost F is the inaction rate: that is the most
responsive matched moment with respect to the ﬁxed cost F.
I did similar calculations for a wide range of structural parameter vectors and always found that the inaction
rate is highly responsive for the ﬁxed cost F, while the reduced regression parameter estimates are not. So
it seems to be a global phenomenon that the reduced regression alone only poorly identiﬁes the ﬁxed cost
parameter, and it is the inaction rate that brings identiﬁcation.
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